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Abstract: Ireland experienced significant competitiveness gains in the 1990s on the basis of the
standard manufacturing unit labour cost-based measure of the real effective exchange rate. A few
sectors mostly dominated by multinational companies have accounted for the bulk of value added
in production. Their productivity gains have greatly contributed to Ireland’s exceptional growth
performance in the 1990s, which has earned it the nickname of “Celtic Tiger.” However, these
sectors represent a disproportionately smaller share of manufacturing employment, and
competitiveness in employment-intensive sectors has been much weaker. This paper thus explores
Irish competitiveness from the viewpoint of risks to employment.
I INTRODUCTION
T
he Irish manufacturing sector has made sizeable competitive gains in
recent years. When the standard unit labour cost-based measure of the
real effective exchange rate (REER) is used to gauge external competitiveness
for manufacturing, Ireland’s competitive position appears to have improved
remarkably during the recent half decade (Figure 1).1 The improvement has
been mainly due to a persistent drop in Irish unit labour costs (ULCs) and, to
a lesser extent, depreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate. The main
contribution to falling ULCs has come from a surge in manufacturing
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1 Throughout this paper, a decline in a REER or NEER index denotes a depreciation or gain in
competitiveness. See Appendix for data sources.productivity, which, until 2001, more than offset the impact arising from
increases in hourly wages. In 2001, a cyclically-driven fall in the production of
tradables and a surge in hourly wages arrested the trend improvement in
external competitiveness. However, given past gains, the overall competitive
position of the Irish manufacturing sector based on the standard indicator still
remains strong.2 Moreover, the outstanding performance of Irish
manufacturing has helped to keep the current account close to balance in
recent years, despite substantial outflows of factor payments and large deficits
in the services balance. 
Nevertheless, this paper argues that these considerable gains in
competitiveness have not been broad-based. Such gains reflect developments
against particular international markets, especially the United Kingdom. In
addition, the overall success has been accounted for mainly by the astonishing
performance of a handful of sectors mostly dominated by multinational
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Figure 1: Developments in Competitiveness
2 The most recent data suggest that a rebound in manufacturing production in the first quarter of
2002 resulted in a significant drop in ULCs. The developments across sectors were, however,
uneven and may be partly related to very strong productivity gains that are characteristic of
cyclical turning points. Therefore, it could be premature to suggest that the Irish manufacturing
productivity has returned to its earlier trend.companies, whose gains in productivity often result from intangible foreign
inputs of production, such as global investment in research, product develop-
ment, and advertising. Section II sets the structure and development of the
Irish tradable sector in its historical context.
This paper also argues that there are important employment and welfare
consequences to the differences in competitiveness across manufacturing
sectors. The key industries that account for the bulk of value added in
production represent a disproportionately smaller share of total manufactur-
ing employment. Section III discusses the concepts and standard measures of
international competitiveness. However, the marked difference between
production and employment shares in Irish manufacturing industries implies
that the standard measures are inadequate. To address the risks for manu-
facturing employment, it is vital to gauge developments in competitiveness
across different sectors as well as their vulnerability to an acceleration in
wage inflation or a potential sustained appreciation of the euro. A new
measure of overall competitiveness is introduced to address these concerns.
Section IV assesses competitiveness using this new measure and also
decomposes trends in competitiveness to determine the sources of gains and
losses. Section V concludes.
II IRISH MANUFACTURING COMPETITIVENESS IN A
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Ireland’s dramatic change in its development strategy in the 1960s laid
the foundation for its impressive economic performance in the recent decades.
Following its independence in 1922, Ireland adopted protectionist external
policies, including high tariff barriers and a prohibition on foreign ownership
of firms operating in Ireland. The motivation was to promote growth of
indigenous manufacturing. However, the failure of this strategy was evident
by the late 1950s, as the “infant industries” remained uncompetitive vis-à-vis
the rest of the world. Within less than a decade, the Irish policymakers
replaced this import competing strategy by the dismantling of most tariff
barriers and a policy aimed at attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) by
offering investment grants and zero corporate profit taxes on manufactured
exports (Barry, Bradley, and O’Malley, 1999). In the late 1960s, the
government undertook a concerted effort to improve the education system, by
removing the fees on secondary education.3 These efforts contributed to an
educated and well-trained Irish labour force.
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3 See Durkan, et al. (1999) for details. Ireland sustained huge inflows of FDI over the next three decades,
attracting the highest share of inflows in the EU. Tables 1 and 2 depict the
shares of FDI in gross domestic product and gross fixed capital formation in
selected countries. Ireland’s inward stock of FDI comprised 23 per cent of GDP,
while FDI inflows represented 19 per cent of gross fixed capital formation in
1997.4 These inflows were higher than those for Western Europe, EU or the
United States, and were on par with some emerging market countries. These
substantial inflows can be attributed in part to Ireland’s outward orientation
starting in the 1960s, and its investment in public education. Gunnigle and
McGuire (2001) note, for instance, that the education level of the workforce
constituted a critical factor in the location decision of many US multi-
nationals.5 Furthermore, strong efforts toward substantial and sustained
fiscal adjustment in the late 1980s provided policy credibility that supported
continued FDI inflows.
FDI contributed to the fast pace of growth and employment in the Irish
economy. Between 1989 and 1997, total employment increased by 15 per cent,
of which about 70 per cent was in foreign-owned industry.6 The increase in FDI
also helped Ireland converge with, and eventually surpass, the EU countries
in terms of its standard of living and output per capita. 
Table 1: Inward and Outward FDI Stocks as a Percentage of 
Gross Domestic Product
Selected Years
1980 1985 1990 1995 1997
EU Inward 5.5 8.6 11.0 12.7 15.2
Outward 6.2 10.3 11.8 15.4 18.6
Ireland Inward 18.5 23.5 12.2 18.2 23.3
Outward 1.0 4.8 6.3 7.9
US Inward 3.1 4.6 7.2 7.7 8.4
Outward 8.1 6.2 7.9 10.0 10.6
Malaysia Inward 21.1 23.7 24.1 31.8 38.1
Outward 1.7 4.4 6.2 13.1 13.0
Singapore Inward 52.9 73.6 78.2 71.2 81.6
Outward 66.6 44.1 21.4 41.9 46.2
Source: World Investment Report, 1999 (United Nations).
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4 The number for FDI as a proportion of GNP would be much higher than as a proportion of GDP
because GDP is higher for Ireland than GNP. See Barry, Hannan, and Strobl (1999). 
5 Indeed, 78 per cent of the FDI inflows into Ireland in 1998 were of US origin.
6 See Barry, Hannan, and Strobl (1999).Table 2: Inward and Outward FDI Flows as a Percentage of 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation, 1987–97
1987–1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
EU Inward 5.8 5.9 5.6 7.2 6.8 8.5
Outward 8.3 7.6 8.9 10.0 11.4 14.8
Ireland Inward 8.9 14.9 9.6 13.4 20.6 19.0
Outward 5.5 2.9 5.0 7.6 5.7 7.0
US Inward 6.0 5.1 4.7 5.8 7.0 9.3
Outward 3.9 8.8 7.7 9.1 6.9 9.4
Malaysia Inward 18.1 20.3 14.9 11.1 12.1 12.2
Outward 2.8 5.9 8.9 8.2 9.9 8.2
Singapore Inward 32.2 23.1 36.1 25.6 23.1 27.3
Outward 7.4 10.6 19.3 22.3 18.4 13.3
Source: World Investment Report, 1999 (United Nations).
Nevertheless, the activities of multinationals have led to an overstatement
of the convergence of Irish output per capita with respect to other advanced
economies. The multinational firms operating in the Irish economy have used
Ireland mostly as a production base rather than as a final market, and the low
corporate tax rate in Ireland has provided incentives for transfer pricing.
These firms have repatriated their profits, as reflected in the large negative
net factor income from abroad amounting to almost 15 per cent of GDP in
recent years (Table 3). Payment of royalties and other fees for the use of
patents, etc., have constituted another element of outflows. As a consequence
of these outflows, GNP is significantly lower than GDP.
Gunnigle and McGuire (2001) point to some other “downsides” of Ireland’s
reliance on FDI. They argue that many firms are located in very volatile
sectors, the level of R&D in Ireland is low and linkages into the domestic
economy are weak. Moreover, while FDI flows into the manufacturing sector
have contributed significantly to the Irish growth experience in the past, the
sustainability of this growth is unclear. As Barry, Bradley, and O’Malley (1999)
point out, FDI flowed into tradable industries where Ireland had a
comparative disadvantage. In particular, FDI went into sectors with increas-
ing returns to scale so that the multinationals could lower production costs
and establish distribution networks. The authors also find that the foreign
firms tend to be larger, more productive, more profitable, with higher pro-
pensity to import their material inputs and are more export oriented compared
to the indigenous plants. In addition, a small number of high-tech industries,
including organic chemicals, pharmaceuticals, electronic machinery, office and
HOW COMPETITIVE IS IRISH MANUFACTURING 177automatic data-processing equipment, and “miscellaneous foods” have
contributed disproportionately to the FDI and export boom (Walsh, 1996).
While foreign affiliates represent a large share of value added and exports,
they constitute a much lower share of employment generated in the
manufacturing sector (Table 4). In 1998, foreign affiliates produced 82 per cent
of the output in manufacturing but employed only 47 per cent of the total
employees in manufacturing. The ratio of value added to employment
generated in manufacturing by the foreign-owned firms is 1.75, which is much
higher than other comparable countries, including those such as Singapore
and Malaysia with high value added in foreign affiliates. Since most countries
that experience these huge inflows of FDI do not experience a very skewed
employment and output structure, the implications of such skewed
distribution have gone largely unnoticed in the literature. Walsh (1996) notes
that net output per employee is much higher in foreign than Irish firms, but
does not analyse its implications for employment. 
Barry and Hannan (1995) argue that the influx of multinationals may
have distorted wage setting behaviour and thereby worsened unemployment
through “Irish disease”. The indigenous firms were small-scale with low
productivity and low wages before 1960s. However, the multinationals that
entered after the opening of trade had high productivity and access to a large
European market. The high marginal productivity of labour in these
multinationals implied that the firms could afford to pay higher wages relative
to the domestic firms.7 Nevertheless, Barry (1996) finds that in the period
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Table 3: Net Factor Income from Abroad for Ireland:
Selected Years
Net Factor Income from Net Factor Income from









Source: International Financial Statistics for 1950–1985; Central Statistics Office
thereafter.
7 See Fitz Gerald (1999).1980 to 1992, wage growth in the traditional sector kept pace with wages in
the modern sector, which outstripped productivity growth in the traditional
sector. The rise in wages contributed to the decline of the traditional
manufacturing sector, and Barry and Hannan (1995) suggest that such
crowding out of the indigenous sector could, under certain circumstances, lead
to a reduction in total employment. In addition, the foreign-owned firms
employ higher proportions of skilled labour than the indigenous manu-
facturing industry, and Barry and Hannan (1996) find that the skill gap
between indigenous and foreign firms has been increasing. As unemployment
risks are greater for workers with low education (Sexton and O’Connell, 1996),
wage growth in excess of productivity growth in the indigenous sector that
results from a distorted wage formation mechanism could have even greater
adverse impact on the indigenous employment levels.
While the literature discussed above suggests that high wage growth has
crowded out the traditional sector, many studies and recent evidence suggest
that large gains in Irish manufacturing competitiveness has contributed to
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Table 4: Significance of Foreign Affiliates: Value Added, Employment 
and Exports
Value Added No. of  Exports of Ratio of
of Foreign Employees Foreign Value
Affiliates in Foreign Affiliates Added to
(% of total Affiliates (% of total Employment 
VA in mfg) (% of total  exports)
employees in mfg)
Ireland 1/ 2/ 1983 59.0 39.0 83.2 1.513
1990 68.0 45.0 35.2 1.511
1998 82.0 47.0 n.a. 1.745
UK 1985 18.0 13.7 n.a. 1.314
1992 23.6 18.2 n.a. 1.297
Malaysia 1985 30.2 29.8 17.9 1.013
1994 57.2 43.7 51.0 1.309
Singapore 3/ 1980 64.0 52.0 62.6 1.231
1994 70.4 52.1 60.6 1.351
Source: World Investment Report (1999) for all except Ireland.
1/ Figures for VA and employment from OECD (2001).
2/ 1985 and 1993 for exports instead of 1983 and 1990; Source: Walsh (1996).
3/ 1996 for employment and exports and 1985 for exports.Ireland’s recent spectacular employment and output growth.8 Walsh (1999,
2000) states that the Irish policymakers consistently emphasised stabilising
nominal wages to increase employment. As others, he finds that the dramatic
decline of relative unit labour costs since the mid-1980s substantially
improved the competitiveness of manufacturing industry.9 Walsh attributes
this dramatic decline in relative unit labour costs to low wage inflation, a
stable nominal effective exchange rate, and productivity growth in Irish
industry resulting from inflows of FDI and foreign technology. An OECD
(2002) study also ascribes a decline in unit labour cost to the rapid growth of
productivity. The next section discusses measures of international
competitiveness, and introduces a measure that is more relevant for the Irish
situation. 
III MEASURES OF INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS
The concept of competitiveness is frequently associated with the
sustainability of a country’s trade balance and the ability of internationally
exposed industries to maintain their market shares. While many factors that
impinge on a country’s competitiveness are qualitative in nature, the
assessment of competitiveness typically relies on quantitative indicators of a
country’s competitive position. 
The most common indicators include real exchange rates based on relative
unit labour costs or relative consumer price levels, and relative export unit
prices (Fagerberg, 1988; Lipschitz and McDonald, 1992; Turner and Van’t
dack, 1993; Marsh and Tokarick, 1994; and Turner and Golub, 1997). The real
exchange rate based on relative consumer prices includes non-traded as well
as traded goods, and so may be a less useful indicator of trade performance.
Consumer prices are based on prices of final goods, so they exclude
intermediate goods, which are an important component of international trade.
Furthermore, consumer prices may not be an accurate measure of underlying
domestic costs when they are distorted by price controls and excise taxes, or
when “pricing to market” results in a temporary change in profit margins
rather than changes in competitiveness. Relative export unit values may also
reflect pricing to market effects and may be overweighted in primary product
prices. Moreover, they are often calculated as average values and thus can be
distorted by compositional effects. The real exchange rate based on relative
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8 See Walsh (1996, 1999 and 2000). 
9 Relative unit labour costs are computed by an index that measures changes in nominal wages,
productivity, and the nominal exchange rate, all relative to trading partners.unit labour costs helps assess developments in profitability of producing
traded goods, as labour represents an important input to production of these
goods. Data on wage costs are also generally widely available on a comparable
basis for advanced countries. Turner and Van’t dack (1993) conclude that the
real exchange rate based on relative unit labour costs is probably the best
single indicator of competitiveness for advanced economies. This indicator is
focused on a large component of trade, and avoids endogeneity with the
exchange rate, which affects the CPI and export price measures. International
differences in labour costs represent a key component of policies designed to
ensure macroeconomic stability. Carlin, Glyn, and Van Reenen (2001) find that
the real exchange rate based on unit labour costs is a significant determinant
of export market shares for a sample of 14 OECD countries, and that
proportionate changes in the components of relative unit labour costs (the
nominal exchange rate, wages, and productivity) have approximately the same
long-run effect on export market shares.





Hours worked per person
The real exchange rate based on unit labour costs is calculated as the ratio
of unit labour costs in the home country relative to its trading partner,
expressing the data in a common currency:
RERULC
Ireland,c = NERIreland,c * (ULCIreland/ULCc) (2)
The real “effective” exchange rate is then calculated as the weighted sum
over all trading partners, where the weights represent the share of each
country in Ireland’s external trade. 
REERULC = Σ twc * RERULC
Ireland,c (3)
c
Welfare implications underlie the concern for monitoring external trade
performance. Examining trends in external trade can help assess the
sustainability of current account balances and whether the current exchange
rate is appropriate. A persistent current account deficit would require an
eventual adjustment as a combination of depreciation and deflation, and could
lead to a balance of payments crisis, which could cause a serious economic
disruption. A country may also be concerned with shifts in market shares at
the sectoral level because such shifts could imply changes in the sectoral
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(1)composition of output and in living standards. While economic policies cannot
prevent losses in some sectoral market shares, given dynamic comparative
advantage, policies must ensure that the economy is flexible enough to adjust
to these shifts at minimum costs and to reallocate resources in order to
ultimately improve living standards (Krugman, 1996). 
Employment generation constitutes an important component of social
welfare. Employment growth is linked to the competitive position of the
country and to its sectoral shifts in production. In addition, a sharp rise in
unemployment could represent one of the major economic disruptions
associated with a balance of payments crisis. Thus, the concern about current
account sustainability is fundamentally based on its implications for living
standards and social welfare, which are affected by job growth and
unemployment.
Although useful for predicting trade flows, the standard real exchange
rate based on unit labour costs may provide a misleading measure of
unemployment risks in the Irish case. This competitiveness indicator has the
limitation that it merely captures labour costs, without considering their
proportionate share of total production costs. Movements in unit labour costs
may reflect capital substitution, rather than changes in labour productivity. In
Ireland, the employment share of the multinational sector is much smaller
than its output or value-added share, given higher capital and R&D inputs
into that sector. Thus, the multinational sector receives a larger weight in the
indicator than is justified by concerns about employment.
This paper introduces a measure of the real exchange rate based on unit
labour costs that is weighted to more accurately reflect the pattern of
employment across industries, which enables us better to gauge potential
unemployment risks. For a particular industry i, the relative unit labour costs





= ec * –––––– (4)
ULCi
c
where  ec is the nominal exchange rate of country c relative to the Irish
currency. 
“Effective” unit labour costs in industry i are constructed by summing
relative unit labour costs of Ireland over all its trading partners, where the
weights, twi
c, are based on the shares of Irish exports in industry i that are
destined to each country.
relative ULCi
Irl,all 
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(REER), is then constructed by summing over all industries, using weights, ωi,
that can either depend on the employment share of each industry or the
output share of each industry in total manufacturing.




When the weights are based on the output (or value-added) share in each
industry, the REER is analogous to the standard measure of real exchange
rate, unit labour costs. This measure attaches more importance to industries
with high productivity. The employment weighted index, however, is more
directly linked to the fundamental concern with employment risks.
IV COMPARING ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF EXTERNAL
COMPETITIVENESS
Developments in unit labour costs have been less impressive in
employment-intensive sectors. An analysis gauging changes in unit labour
costs and competitiveness using the employment weighted index—which
better assesses developments in the employment-intensive indigenous sectors
as well as the risks to employment posed by the recent downturn and marked
wage increases than the standard output-based measure—suggests that past
gains in competitiveness have been relatively limited, as Irish unit labour
costs have been broadly stable from 1995–2000 (Figure 2). During this period,
high productivity growth was offset by rapid wage increases. However, the
combination of falling production and steep increases in labour costs during
2001 has had a drastic negative effect on unit labour costs although the output
decline is in part cyclical, and hence, may be temporary. 
External competitiveness as measured by the employment-weighted
REER has been much bleaker than suggested by the standard measure of the
REER. The contrast between the two measures of the real effective exchange
rate based on employment and output shares is striking (Figure 3). The REER
based on weighting the industries by their shares in manufacturing output
suggests that overall competitiveness continued to improve dramatically until
2001, in contrast to the broadly stable developments in the employ-
ment-weighted index. The more robust gains in competitiveness indicated by
the output-based measure are largely explained by the very strong
performance of a few industries that have accounted for the most of the recent
growth in manufacturing and that are generally characterised by very high
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sectors, the two measures have been diverging since early 1997, with the
production-weighted measure appearing more immune to rising wage costs.10
Ireland’s competitiveness has been particularly strong relative to the
United Kingdom. Compared to the United Kingdom alone, Irish manu-
facturing has achieved sizeable competitiveness gains, even as measured with
an employment-weighted index (Figure 4). Moreover, the United Kingdom is
Ireland’s single largest trading partner, with export shares varying from
14 per cent to 84 per cent in major industries. Therefore, competitiveness
gains relative to the United Kingdom have also contributed to maintaining
external competitiveness on an effective basis (i.e., compared with all trading
partners). 
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Figure 2: Decomposition of Irish ULCs, 
Weighted by Employment Share in Industry
10 The real effective exchange rate as reported in the IMF’s International Financial Statistics
(IFS) matches the index of output-weighted REER relatively closely. However, the recent pick-up
in the latter index goes largely unnoticed in the IFS index because it is smoothed using a Hodrick-
Prescott (H-P) filter. There are tradeoffs between these measures. The filtering used in the IFS
index smoothes out cyclical swings in productivity to obtain a gauge of underlying trends. On the
other hand, H-P filters suffer from well-known end-point problems. Moreover, it can be argued
that the output-weighted index measures competitiveness more accurately than the IFS index,
since it applies industry-specific partner-country trade weights, rather than partner weights
based on aggregate export trade.HOW COMPETITIVE IS IRISH MANUFACTURING 185
Figure 3: Real Effective Exchange rates
Figure 4: Real Effective Exchange rates
Multilateral vs United KingdomMost of the improvement in external competitiveness measured by the
employment-weighted index was due to a weak exchange rate. Disaggregating
the contributions of the effective nominal exchange rate and relative ULC
components to the real effective exchange rate suggests that much of the past
competitiveness gains of the employment-intensive manufacturing industries
were related to the weakness of the nominal exchange rate rather than
favourable developments in Irish ULCs relative to its trading partners
(Figure 5). Indeed, relative unit labour costs at constant 1995:Q3 exchange
rates have been broadly stable until 2001, after which they surged by over
15 per cent, partly reflecting a cyclical decline in output. Appreciation of
sterling and the US dollar in 1997 and 1999–2000, in particular, contributed
to a decline in the REER. 
Irish competitiveness is vulnerable to an appreciation of the euro,
particularly against sterling. Historical simulations of exchange rate changes
(assuming no response in ULCs) indicate that the employment-weighted index
is more sensitive to a sharp depreciation of sterling than to the US dollar
(Figure 6). Indeed, if sterling had depreciated by 20 per cent relative to the
Irish currency, there would have been an upward shift in the REER by 7 per
cent compared with a shift of only 3 per cent for an equivalent depreciation of
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Figure 5: Exchange Rate Effectsthe US dollar. For the output-weighted index, a 20 per cent depreciation of
sterling would have led to an increase of the REER by around 51/2 per cent,
and by 31/2–4 per cent for a similar depreciation of the US dollar. Losses in
Irish competitiveness resulting from an appreciation of the euro in 2002 would
come on top of the already rapid cyclical deterioration that took place in 2001.
The level differences in the employment versus output-weighted REERs in
2001 suggest that employment-intensive firms and sectors would be particu-
larly vulnerable to euro appreciation.11
Competitiveness has varied considerably across Irish manufacturing
industries. The chemical and pharmaceutical industries (NACE industry 24)
registered the strongest competitiveness gains during the period 1995–2001
(Figure 7). This key sector accounted for more than half of manufacturing
output in the first quarter of 2002, but only about 9 per cent of the labour
share of manufacturing. Within the electronics industries, there was also
considerable divergence, with office machinery and communication equipment
(NACE sectors 30 and 32, respectively) losing ground, and electrical
machinery and medical and other instruments (NACE sectors 31 and 33,
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11 Walsh (1996) also recognises that trade with the sterling area is particularly price sensitive and
labour intensive.
Figure 6: Effects of Key Exchange Rate Changesrespectively) gaining ground over the half decade. The food, beverage, and
tobacco industries (NACE sectors 15–16), which account for 18 per cent of
manufacturing employment, had relative unit labour costs that were fairly
unchanged over the period.
Excluding some of the key sectors from the employment-weighted index
reveals that external competitiveness of the remaining manufacturing
industries has deteriorated even more sharply. An employment-weighted
index—although more useful than an output-weighted index for determining
the likely employment consequences of a shock to Irish wages or exchange
rates—still masks some important differences across sectors. The chemical
industry and some electronics industries have had substantial gains. The
profit margins in these industries may act as a cushion against shocks,
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Figure 7: Relative Effective Unit Labour Costs.
Key Industries 1/although global production decisions must be considered in the context of the
multinational firms’ overall profits and demand conditions. Moreover, the
extremely high level of value added per worker and the small share of labour
costs to output suggest that these sectors may not be very sensitive to
developments in wage costs. Thus, the employment risks of a shock are likely
to be relatively minor. Thus, it is useful to examine developments in Irish
competitiveness after excluding these key industries (Figure 8).
• Excluding the chemicals and pharmaceuticals industries (NACE 24), the
remaining manufacturing industries suffered a major setback in their
competitive position in 2001. 
• The employment-weighted REER has deteriorated sharply excluding
industries that have recorded the most impressive gains in productivity in
recent years and could be considered “productivity outliers” (NACE 24, 31
and 33). This measure of the real effective exchange rate started to
appreciate already in 2000 and leaped up by some 20 per cent in 2001. The
results are comparable to those that excluded the data for chemicals and
pharmaceuticals industries, but the decline in competitiveness is even
larger, reflecting the drastic production cuts in the worst performing
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) industries (namely,
NACE 30 and NACE 32).
• Competitiveness has actually been stronger excluding only the electronics
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Figure 8: REERs Excluding Key Industriesindustries (NACE 30–33). The exceptionally poor performance of the office,
accounting and computing machinery industry (NACE 30) and the radio,
TV and communication equipment industry (NACE 32) more than offset the
gains of the electrical machinery and apparatus industry (NACE 31) and
the medical, precision, optical, and clocks instruments industry (NACE 33).
This poor performance is partly explained by recent production cuts.
However, sectoral analysis of relative unit labour costs vis-à-vis trading
partner countries reveals that the deterioration of the competitiveness in
the production of NACE industries 30 and 32 was underway long before the
current global slowdown. 
V CONCLUSIONS
While it is a standard practice in international economics to use output as
weights when calculating the relative unit labour costs, our concern is that it
is not an appropriate measure to gauge Ireland’s competitiveness. Much of the
gains in the recent years have arisen because of higher output growth of the
manufacturing sector, where a handful of sectors dominated by multinational
companies gained in productivity from intangible foreign inputs of production.
In 1983, the foreign owned firms accounted for 59 per cent of the output and
39 per cent of the employment in the manufacturing sector. However, in 1998,
the same firms accounted for 82 per cent of the output and 47 per cent of the
employment in manufacturing (OECD, 2001). 
Once we account for employment in the calculation of relative unit labour
costs, we find that changes in competitiveness in the second half of the 1990s
were less impressive than suggested by the standard aggregate indicator.
Indeed, the multilateral REER calculated using weights based on relative
employment shares—rather than output shares—suggests that gains in
competitiveness were fairly limited during 1995–2000. Moreover, earlier gains
were more than offset in 2001, partly due to cyclical production cuts. The main
reasons for the particularly weak performance in external competitiveness in
2001 were the global economic slowdown, the bursting of the ICT bubble, and
the rapid increases in Irish wage costs. Moreover, the analysis indicates that
while some sectors remained extremely competitive in the second half of the
1990s, high wage growth and substantial sectoral productivity differentials
have resulted in an increased dispersion of competitive positions across
various industries. The strong gains in aggregate productivity—particularly
in the chemicals and pharmaceuticals industry—have masked a significant
deterioration of external competitiveness in sectors that account for the main
part of the Irish manufacturing employment.
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Using the employment-weighted measure for the real effective exchange rate
reveals that the depreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate played an
important role in generating past competitiveness gains, as illustrated by the
disaggregation of the REER index into nominal exchange rate and relative
ULC components. The risk to competitiveness is most marked relative to the
strength of sterling, given that the United Kingdom has been Ireland’s largest
trading partner and has contributed to maintaining Irish competitiveness over
the last half decade.
APPENDIX:  DATA SOURCES
The data frequency for all variables is quarterly. 
The Central Statistical Office (CSO) of Ireland was the source of Irish data
on production, employment, hours worked, and wages by NACE sector. 
OECD was the source of partner country data on unit labour costs. In
particular, data on production and employment was available from the OECD
Indicators of Industry and Services for each country. The statistics are
classified by economic activities following the International Standard
Industrial Classification (ISIC Revision 3). Hours worked per employee in the
business sector and hourly earnings of the manufacturing sector were taken
from the OECD Analytical Database for each country on an aggregate basis.
Missing observations, which were more frequent at the end of the sample,
were supplemented by unit labour costs in domestic currency for the business
sector, from the OECD Analytical Database. Nominal exchange rates were
obtained from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.
Irish exports to each country by each industry were taken from the World
Bank’s World Integrated Trade Solutions, which contains trade statistics from
the COMTRADE database made available by the United Nations Statistics
Division. SITC industry classifications were matched by description to NACE
industries to obtain sectoral direction of trade estimates. Export weights were
based on averages over 1998–2000. 
The CSO was the source of data on the employment share of each industry
in total manufacturing in Ireland and 1995 value-added shares of each
industry. The weights used to construct the output-weighted REERs were
based on output shares at the beginning of 2002, which were obtained by
accumulating 1995 value-added shares of each industry using production
indices.  
Final index calculations were seasonally adjusted using the Census X-11
method and rebased to 1995: q3 = 100. 
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